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NIXON V. SHRINK MISSOURI GOVERNMENT PAC: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS ,
SYMBOLIC SPEECH AND THE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
1

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (Shrink III) is the most
important case involving campaign finance reform since the Supreme Court
2
decided Buckley v. Valeo. The Court has addressed various campaign
3
finance issues subsequent to Buckley, but it has not addressed the
4
constitutionality of limits on individual campaign contributions to a candidate.
1

119 S. Ct. 901 (1999), certifying questions to Shrink Missouri Government PAC v.
Adams (Shrink II), 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998).
2
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of limits on campaign contributions in the context of the Federal Election
Contributions Act (Act). Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-30. The Act provided that no
“person shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for
Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $ 1,000.” Id. at 189, quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(b)(1) (1970 ed., Supp IV). A “person” is defined as “an individual, partnership,
committee, association, corporation, or any other organization or group of persons.”
Id. at 187, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 591(g) (1970 ed., Supp IV).
3
These issues include: expenditures by corporations and political committees: Federal
Election Comm’n. v. National Conservative PAC (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480 (1985)
(invalidating certain expenditure limits by political action committees (hereinafter
PACs) when a presidential candidate accepts public financing); contribution and
expenditure limitations involving ballot measures, First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating expenditure restrictions on a corporation that
intended to influence ballot initiatives); Citizens Against Rent Control / Coalition for
Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, Cal. (Citizens Against Rent Control), 454 U.S. 290
(1981) (invalidating contribution limits to committees formed to support or oppose
ballot initiatives); contributions to multicandidate PACs, California Medical Ass'n v.
FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding $5,000 contribution limit to multicandidate
political committees).
4
Numerous commentators disagree with effectiveness or propriety of limits on
campaign contributions. Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance
Regulations and the First Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (1997) (stating that political
liberties will be sacrificed by another unsuccessful attempt to prevent corruption and
promote equality in campaign financing); Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of
Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213 (1989) (concluding that
the only way to ensure equality in campaign financing is to increase, or “level-up”
spending because leveling-down benefits the wealthy at the expense of the working
classes); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50
STAN. L. REV. 893 (1998) (stating that opponents of campaign finance reform promote
equality by recognizing that voters use different decisional criteria when choosing a
candidate, and increased speech as the result of increased spending is necessary to
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5

The Buckley Court held that contributions limits are permissible, but it
6
was ambiguousabout the appropriate standard of review. As a result, courts
employ varying standards and levels of proof to determine if a contribution limit
7
is unconstitutionally low. The Eighth Circuit is unique because it has reviewed
8
more cases challenging contribution limits than any other circuit. Some
commentators believe that the Circuit’s standard of review is so strict that
campaign finance reform employing limits on campaign contributions is nearly
9
impossible in the Eighth Circuit.
The purpose of this note is two-fold. First , it reviews pertinent cases
10
and sets forth the appropriate standard of review for contribution limits.
Second, it delineates the test that enables government to customize
contribution limits to the characteristics of its voting districts without violating
11
the First Amendment.
Part II provides a brief history of campaign finance
12
reform, emphasizing limits on campaign contributions. Part III examines the
history of campaign contribution limits in Missouri and the Eighth Circuit’s
13
role. Part IV concludes that contribution limits are entitled to a heightened

facilitate these decisions).
5

”Congress was surely entitled to conclude that . . . contribution ceilings were a
necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption.”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.
6
The Court fails to define the appropriate scope of review concerning contribution limits.
Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (1985).
7
See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
8
For a history of campaign finance reform cases in the Eighth Circuit and a summary
of contribution caps in the United States, see William J. Connolly, Note, How Low Can
You Go? State Campaign Contribution Limits and the First Amendment, 76 B.U.L.
REV. 483 (1996).
9
See Matthew S. Criscimagna, Note, The Narrow Application of Buckley v. Valeo: Is
Campaign Finance Reform Possible in the Eighth Circuit?, 64 MO. L. REV. 437 (1999).
10
The appropriate standard of review is a heightened intermediate level of review. See
infra notes 65-95 and accompanying text.
11
Nixon v. Shrink Government PAC (Shrink III) addresses the singular issue of
contribution limits and does not address other reform techniques such as limits on
non-resident contributions, restrictions on intra-candidate contributions, or defined
fundraising seasons. __ U.S. __, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999). See infra note 19 (discussing
other reform techniques).
12
See infra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes 40-64 and accompanying text.
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14

intermediate standard of review.
The court should defer to a reasonable
legislative determination that the electorate perceives corruption due to large
15
campaign contributions
and address two questions to determine if
contribution limits are unconstitutionally low: first, whether the limitation impairs
a candidate’s ability to amass the resources necessary for an effective
campaign; and second, whether the percentage of contributors affected by the
16
limits is within a reasonable range.
II. BACKGROUND
The cost of political campaigns began to increase in the early
17
nineteenth century.
In response to the growing reliance on campaign
contributions, state and federal governments have attempted to regulate
campaign financing to eliminate the corruptive influences of large campaign
14

See infra notes 65-101 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 102-121 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 122-133 and accompanying text.
17
Smith, supra note 4, at 9-11. Professor Smith attributes this to a number of factors.
Inflation is one factor. Id. at 12. One dollar in 1900 is worth twenty dollars today. Id.
In addition, the cost of essential items of campaigning such as paper, postage and
advertising have increased more than the rate of inflation. Id. at 13. A second factor
is the growth in the size of the electorate. Id. at 13-14. This is attributable to a
number of events:
States gradually dropped religious and property qualifications for
voting. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution eliminated
formal bans on voting based explicitly on race. The Nineteenth
Amendment enfranchised women and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
gave eighteen year-olds the right to vote. Statutory changes have
also expanded the franchise. Especially notable is the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, a stunning success in eliminating legal barriers to black
voter registration in the South. The Supreme Court also expanded
the electorate, through a series of decisions striking down
‘grandfather clauses,’ whites-only primary elections, bans on voting
by citizens in the military, poll taxes and unduly long residency
requirements.
Id. (citations omitted). A third reason for the increase in the cost of elections is the
“gradual democratization of campaign methods.” Id. at 15. Political campaigns
shifted away from communicating through partisan newspapers and circulars to a style
of campaigning that brought the candidate in contact with the electorate. Id. Also
important are the cost of complying with campaign regulations and the increase in
available funds for campaigns. Id. at 16-17 Finally, the growth of government is the
most important factor of all. Id. at 18. As Government has more power to “bestow
benefits on the populace, or to regulate human endeavors,” groups and individuals have
more incentive to influence those who wield this power. Id. at 17.
15
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donations and to equalize the voices of the electorate.
Since the early
19
1800s, the government has taken various approaches to “reform”, but the
20
most popular, and the most controversial, are limitations on the amount one
can spend on a campaign and the amount of money one can contribute to a
candidate or political committee.
A. Buckley v. Valeo

21

In 1974, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaigns Act of
22
23
1971 (FECA), in part, by limiting political contributions and expenditures by
18

The first campaign finance laws addressed the corruptive influence of corporate
contributions. Id. at 20-21. Between 1907 and the present, Congress has amended
federal election laws eleven times. Id. at 20-24. The Watergate scandals of 1972-74
prompted Congress to pass the 1974 Federal Election Campaigns Act (FECA)
Amendments, which were the subject of Buckley v. Valeo. Id. at 24-25. In Buckley,
the Court held that the goal of equalizing the electorate’s voice is an illegitimate state
interest in the context of campaign expenditure limits. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49
(emphasis added). “[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment . . . .” Id.
19
Other approaches to reform include: disclosure requirements, Buckley, 424 U.S. at
60-85; public financing schemes, Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637
(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied. 522 U.S. 860 (1997); limitations on non-resident
contributions, Vanatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S.Ct. 870 (1999); Whitmore v. FEC, 68 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1155 (1996); defined fundraising seasons, Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1112 (1999); North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett,
168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed (May 18, 1999); Emison v.
Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); restrictions on intra-candidate
transfers, Service Employees Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Fair Political Practice
Comm’n, 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 505 U.S. 1230 (1992); Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996); Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1996), aff’d and
remanded,149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 890 (1999).
20
Contribution limits are popular because it is one of the few accessible tools available
in the current political climate. See infra note 37.
21
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
22
The relevant provisions addressing contribution limits were: 18 USCS § 608(b)(1)
(limiting to $1,000 political contributions by an individual, organization or group to any
single candidate); 18 USCS § 608(b)(2) (limiting contributions by a political committee
to any single candidate to $5,000); 18 USCS § 608(b)(3) (limiting total annual
contributions by any contributor to $25,000); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 & nn.12-15.
23
The relevant provisions addressing expenditure limitations were 18 USCS § 608(e)(1)
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individuals, political committees and candidates in federal elections. Soon
thereafter the Court questioned whether contribution and expenditure
limitations violated the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech or
24
association, by drawing a parallel between spending money and political
speech:
[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their expression,
and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society
25
requires the expenditure of money.
26

The Court then distinguished independent expenditures and campaign
contributions by focusing on the quantity of political speech affected by the
27
28
limitations. Under a “rigorous ” standard of review, the Court held that limits
(limiting to $1,000 total annual expenditures advocating election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate); 18 USCS § 608(a)(1) (limiting expenditures by a candidate for a
calendar year); 18 USCS § 608(c) (limiting overall expenditures by a candidate). Id.
24
Contribution limits implicate freedom of association because there is value in
“persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a common end.”
Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294. “[B]y collective effort individuals can
make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or lost.” Id.
“[T]he freedom of association is diluted if it does not include the right to pool money
through contributions, for funds are often essential if ‘advocacy’ is to be truly or
optimally ‘effective’.” Id. at 296, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65-66.
25
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. Professor Balkin argues that “money as speech” is an
example of the ideological shift occurring with free speech. J. M. Balkin, Some
Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990
DUKE L.J. 375 (1990). “Freedom of speech has typically ensured that one could affect
change in society by the expression of a viewpoint even though the viewpoint is
unpopular.” Id. at 383. In contrast today, business interests and conservative groups
are using freedom of speech as a way to preserve the status quo. Id. at 384. “What
was sauce for the liberal goose increasingly has become sauce for the more
conservative gander.” Id.
26
An expenditure is independent if it is done without “prearrangement and coordination”
with the candidate. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518
U.S. 604, 615 (1996).
27
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18-19. Justice White disagreed with this position. Id. at 259
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He stated that the Act does not
restrict speech, but only regulated “giving and spending money.” Id. This has First
Amendment significance because “money may be used to defray the expenses of
speaking or otherwise communicating about the merits or demerits of federal
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on independent expenditures are unconstitutional because they impose
29
“substantial rather than merely theoretical” restraints on speech, and
30
therefore, directly infringe political speech and political association.
Conversely, the Court established the constitutionality of contribution limits,
31
finding that campaign contributions are symbolic speech
and that
32
contributors have other ways to exercise their First Amendment freedoms.
33
Finally, the government’s interest in preventing corruption and
the
34
35
appearance of corruption is a “sufficiently important interest” to allow
restrictions, and contribution limits are a narrowly tailored method to serve this
36
interest.
candidates for election.” Id. Justice White believed that both contribution and
expenditure limits are constitutional. Id. at 261-66. The distinction between
contributions and expenditures has also drawn ire from Justice Thomas. See
Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 635-37. However, in contrast to Justice White,
Justice Thomas believes that limits on contributions and expenditures are an
unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment rights. Id.
28
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.
29
Id. at 19.
30
Id. In contrast, Professor Neuborne notes that the money equals speech relationship
may hold true at lower levels of spending, but it does not hold true at extremely high
expenditure levels. Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and a
Question, 42 ST . LOUIS U. L.J. 789, 796 (1998). At this level, “speech is merely
repetitive” and is “better viewed as exercises of power, not speech.” Id.
31
The speech is symbolic because it is a general expression of support for a candidate
and the expression does not change significantly with the size of the contribution.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. But see infra note 72.
32
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-22. A contributor could exercise First Amendment speech
rights by discussing candidates and issues. Id. at 21. Further, a contributor is free to
become a member of a political association or “assist personally in the association’s
efforts on behalf of candidates.” Id. at 22. See also infra note 73.
33
Arguably, the issue in Shrink III could turn on whether the legitimate harm is
“corruption and the appearance of corruption,” or “corruption or the appearance of
corruption.” See infra notes 114-15. This note assumes that preventing the
appearance of corruption is a legitimate state interest without proof of actual
corruption.
34
Preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption were the only governmental
interests the Court approved of in Buckley. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
35
Id. at 25.
36
Id. at 28-29. This is because contribution limitations focus
precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions --the narrow
aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for
corruption have been identified -- while leaving persons free to engage
in independent political expression, to associate actively through
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B. Governmental and Judicial Response to Buckley.
States and municipalities imposed a wide range of restrictions on
contributions and expenditures in response to Buckley, and the courts
37
responded in equally diverse ways when the restrictions were challenged.
their volunteering services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless
substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with
financial resources.
Id. at 28.
37
Contribution limits that approach the absolute dollar limit in Buckley are usually
upheld. Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 648 (upholding $1,000 per election year);
Florida Right to Life, Inc. v. Mortham, No. 98-770-CIV-ORL-19A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16694, at *24-25 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 1998) (upholding $500 per election); Driver v.
Distefano, 914 F. Supp. 797 (D.R.I. 1996) (upholding $1,000 per calendar year).
However, courts strike down a wide range of limits. See California Prolife
Council PAC v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1998) aff’d 164 F.3d 1189 (9th
Cir. 1999) (striking down limits of $500 per election if candidate does not agree to
expenditure caps); Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (striking
down limits of $100 for privately-financed candidates per election); National Black
Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 924 F. Supp. 270,
275-81 (D.D.C. 1996), vacated as moot 108 F.3d 346 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (mooted by
passage of legislation increasing contribution limits) (striking down per election cycle
limits for city officials of: $50 for ward office or political party posts, $100 for Districtwide office), Vannatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770 (OR. 1997) (striking down limits of
$500 to candidate of statewide office and $100 to candidate running for state senator
or representative).
The Eighth Circuit has struck down every limit it has reviewed. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC v. Adams (Shrink II), 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999) (striking
down limits tied to race and population in district: $275 for state representative or
population under 100,000, $525 for state senator or population over 100,000, $1,075 for
governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, state auditor,
attorney general or population over 250,000); Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 510 (1998), and cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1040 (1999)
(striking down limits of $300 for office of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of
state, treasurer, auditor, attorney general, and commissioner of state lands; $100 for
all other state public offices); Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied
518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (striking down per election cycle limits tied to number of
residents in district: $100 if under 100,000, $200 if over 100,000 and other than
statewide election, $300 if statewide election); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995) (striking down $100 limit to political
committee or political fund). See also, Arkansas Right to Life State PAC v. Butler, 29
F. Supp. 2d 540 (W.D. Ark. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 1041 (1999) (striking down
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Although courts employ Buckley’s “rigorous” standard of review, they interpret
“rigorous” to require extremes ranging from complete deference to
38
39
governmental findings, to requiring actual proof of corruption.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. History of Limitations on Campaign Contributions in Missouri.
In the spring of 1994, the Missouri General Assembly passed Senate
Bill 650 which limited campaign contributions to $250, $500, or $1,000, per
40
election. In November, 1994, the Missouri electorate approved Proposition A,
which supplanted Senate Bill 650 by lowering contribution limits to $100, $200,
41
or $300, and applied the limits to each election cycle.
The Eighth Circuit
42
invalidated Proposition A in Carver v. Nixon because the State did not submit
limits of $500 to independent expenditure committees).
38
For example, in Kentucky Right to Life, the Sixth Circuit did not require proof of
corruption or the appearance of corruption, it merely restated the legislative purpose of
the act: “to combat actual and perceived corruption in Kentucky politics.” Kentucky
Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 640. The court then considered the next step of the
analysis: whether the limits are narrowly drawn to meet these legitimate interests. Id.
at 648.
39
The Eighth Circuit falls in the latter category and interprets “rigorous” to mean strict
scrutiny. See infra note 59. See also Vannatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d at 785-86
(employing strict scrutiny and requiring proof of harm).
40
Carver, 72 F.3d at 635. The exact limit depended on the type of race or the
population in the district for which the candidate was running: $250 for state
representative or population under 100,000; $500 for state senator or population over
100,000; $1,000 for governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer,
state auditor, attorney general or population over 250,000. Id. at 635. The limit
applied to primary and general elections separately. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC v. Adams (Shrink I), 5 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mo. 1988), rev’d Shrink Missouri
Government PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999), citing Mo.Ann. Stat. §
130.011 (West Supp. 1998). Thus, the contributor could contribute double the
limitation per election cycle by making a contribution in both the primary and general
elections. Carver, 72 F.3d at 635. The limits were to become effective January 1,
1995. Id. at 634.
41
Carver, 72 F.3d at 634 n.1. Proposition A permitted per candidate contributions of
$100 in districts with fewer than 100,000 residents; $200 in districts of 100,000 or
more residents, other than statewide office; and $300 for statewide candidates. Id.
These limits were very low, because an election cycle includes both the primary and
general elections and a per election limit is essentially half of the stated limits. Id. at
635 n.3.
42
72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995).
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evidence to justify why the specific limits were selected, nor why the limits were
narrowly tailored to combat the corruption or appearance of corruption
43
associated with large contributions.
The Carver court enjoined the
44
implementation of Proposition A, and the limits in Senate Bill 650 replaced
45
Proposition A’s limits.

B. Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams (Shrink I):

46

The contribution limits under challenge in Shrink I were $275, $525 or
47
$1075, per election.
The district court upheld the limits using an analysis
48
similar to the one that the Eighth Circuit employed in Carver v. Nixon. First,
the court determined that the State provided sufficient evidence of the
49
appearance of corruption as the result of large campaign contributions. Next,
the court analyzed whether the limits were unconstitutionally low. It noted that
50
Senate Bill 650’s limits were not different in kind from the limits approved in
51
Buckley, even though they were worth only $378, $184.80, and $96.70 after
43

Id. at 641-43.
Id. at 645. See also infra note 41.
45
Shrink I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 737.
46
5 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mo. 1988).
47
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 130.032 (West Supp. 1998). These reflect Senate Bill 650’s
requirement that the state make biannual adjustments for the effects of inflation. Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 130.032.2.
48
Shrink I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
49
Id. at 737-39. “The Court does not believe that polling the citizenry is required . . . ,
members of the legislature are uniquely qualified to gauge whether allowing [large]
contributions to go unchecked endangers our democratic system of government, and,
if so, to prescribe an appropriate remedy therefore.” Id. at 738. ”Even for one
unschooled in politics, no great deductive leap is required to reach a conclusion that
the contribution of substantial sums to a candidate for political office gives rise to a
perception among the public that the contributor is trying to curry favor with the
recipient.” Id. at 739. The circumstances surrounding the enactment of the limits and
common sense were sufficient proof of a perception of corruption. Id. at 738-39 nn.67. The trial court gave a detailed account of newspaper articles, emphasizing that
Proposition A and Senate Bill 650 were enacted based on the public’s perception that
the current system was corrupt, or at least that it appeared corrupt. Id. at 737-39
nn.6-7.
50
Shrink I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 740. A contribution limit is different in kind from the limits
in Buckley if the consequence of the restriction is more than “a marginal restriction
upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at
20.
51
The court reasoned that “despite Missouri’s contribution limits, candidates for state
44
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52

adjusting for inflation to reflect their value in 1976 dollars.
The court
concluded that Senate Bill 650’s limits were narrowly tailored to meet the
legitimate state goal of preventing corruption and the appearance of
53
corruption.
C. Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams (Shrink II)

54

The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s analysis and
55
reversed the ruling by rejecting Missouri’s argument that the limits are subject
56
57
to intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny. Relying on its own rulings and
language from Citizens Against Rent Control / Coalition for Fair Housing v. City
58
of Berkeley, Cal., the court concluded that a “rigorous standard of review” is
59
strict scrutiny. The court focused on one issue after defining the appropriate
elected office are still quite able to raise funds sufficient to run effective campaigns.”
Shrink I, 5 F.Supp 2d at 740-41. The court also noted that the statute required an
adjustment for inflation and that technological advances such as the fax machine, email and the Internet may also help offset the effects of inflation. Id. at 742. In
addition, the court compared the percentage of contributors affected by the limits with
the percentage affected in Buckley. Id. at 741. Senate Bill 650 limits would have
affected only 1.5% to 2.38% of the contributions in a recent election, and this was
below the 5.1% affected in Buckley. Id. at 741. Finally, the court concluded that the
median income of a Missouri household was $31,046 and that the head of this
household “would certainly consider ‘large’ a political contribution in excess of $1,075.”
Id. at 742. This is important because Buckley stated that the only interest to justify
limitations is the “real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on
candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at
25 (emphasis added).
52
These figures reflect an adjustment using the Consumer Price Index. Shrink I. 5 F.
Supp. at 740 n.9.
53
Id. at 742.
54
161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999).
55
Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 523.
56
Id. at 521.
57
Id. at 521, citing Carver, 72 F.3d at 637, Russell, 146 F.3d at 567.
58
454 U.S. 290 (1981). Quoting the “[r]egulation of First Amendment rights is always
subject to exacting judicial review.” Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 521, quoting Citizens
Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294.
59
The court stated that “the Supreme Court ‘articulated and applied a strict scrutiny
standard of review’ to the federal contribution limits . . . and ‘has not ruled that
anything other than strict scrutiny applies in cases involving contribution limits.’”
Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 521, quoting Carver, 72 F.3d at 637, citing Citizens Against
Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294.
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standard of review: whether the state provided evidence of corruption or the
perception of corruption. Quoting,
[w]hen the Government defends a regulation on speech . . . it
must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease
sought to be cured. . . . It must demonstrate that the recited
harms are real, . . . and that the regulation will in fact alleviate
60
these harms in a direct and material way [,]
61

the court discounted the State’s evidence as “conclusory and self-serving,”
holding that strict scrutiny requires objective proof of perceived corruption in
62
Missouri’s political process.
Not only had the state failed to show a
compelling interest that would be served by the restrictions, the restrictions
63
were not narrowly tailored.
It reversed the lower court and held that the
60

Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 522 n.3, quoting U.S. v. National Treasury Employees Union
(NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (internal quotations omitted). This passage is the
court’s primary support for its contention that the Government must submit proof of
actual corruption or the perception of corruption. See also Carver, 72 F.3d at 638. The
court also relies on other Eighth Circuit rulings that demanded proof of actual harm.
Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 521-22, citing Day, 34 F.3d at 1365; Russell, 146 F.3d at 56869; Carver, 72 F.3d at 638.
61
Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 522. As proof of the appearance of corruption, the State
submitted an affidavit of Senator Wayne Goode, who co-chaired the Interim Joint
Committee on Campaign Finance Reform, when Senate Bill 650 was enacted. Id. at
522. “The senator did not state that corruption then existed in the system, only that
he and his colleagues believed there was the ‘real potential to buy votes’ if the limits
were not enacted, and that contributions greater than the limits ‘have the appearance
of buying votes.’” Id. at 522, quoting affidavit of Senator Wayne Goode at p.9. Contra,
Shrink I, supra note 49.
The court characterized the State’s position as assuming “that corruption and
the perception thereof are inherent in political campaigns where large contributions are
made, and that it is unnecessary for the State to demonstrate that these are actual
problems in Missouri’s electoral system.” Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 521. The court cites
NTEU, 513 U.S. 454 (1995), to support its demand for “some demonstrable evidence
that there were genuine problems that resulted from contributions in amounts greater
than the limits in place.” Id. at 521, citing Russell, 146 F.3d at 568. Professor La
Pierre argues that although the Eighth Circuit’s requirement of proof of real harm is
more rigorous than Buckley’s, it comports with more recent Supreme Court cases,
such as NTEU. D. Bruce La Pierre, Raising a New First Amendment Hurtle for
Campaign Finance “Reform,” 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 217 (1998).
62
See Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 522.
63
Id. After adjusting for inflation, the court stated that the “limits appear likely to ‘have
a severe impact on political dialogue’ by preventing many candidates for public office
‘from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.’” Id. at 523, quoting
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64

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
65

The Supreme Court applies a “rigorous” standard of review to both
contribution and independent expenditure limits in order “‘ to assure [the]
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
66
changes desired by the people.’”
However, regardless of the actual label
67
given to the test, the Court applies a heightened intermediate level of review
68
to contribution limits and strict scrutiny to independent expenditure limits.
The most important issue that determines the appropriate level of scrutiny is

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. Ironically, the court appeared to endorse Senate Bill 650’s
limits in Carver v. Nixon. Carver, 72 F.3d at 642-43. The court compared Proposition
A with Senate Bill 650 to highlight why Proposition A limits were not narrowly tailored.
Id.
In considering whether Proposition A limits are narrowly tailored, we
must also recognize that the limits were not adopted in a vacuum.
The question is not simply that of some limits or none at all, but
rather Proposition A as compared to those in Senate Bill 650 . . . .
The Proposition A limits are only ten to twenty percent of the higher
limits in Senate Bill 650. . . . The record is barren of any evidence of
a harm or disease that needed to be addressed between the limits of
Senate Bill 650 and those enacted in Proposition A.
Id.
64
Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 523.
65

For a review of various approaches to the issue of constitutionality, see supra notes
37-39.
66
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
67
“Even a significant interference with protected rights of political association may be
sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs
means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975).
68
Strict scrutiny requires a compelling interest and the governmental restriction must
be necessary to address the compelling need. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 53 (1987). The Court uses strict scrutiny when
analyzing direct infringements on First Amendment rights for political advocacy. See
infra note 81.
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whether the limitation directly infringes First Amendment rights.
1. Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Association

69

70

Both a contributor’s and a candidate’s free speech rights are affected
by limits on campaign contributions. Individuals who make a campaign
contributions are expressing support for a candidate and the candidates’s
views. However, campaign contributions are merely a “general expression of
support” for a candidate and “[t]he expression rests solely on the
71
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.”
At most, the size of the
contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor’s
72
support for the candidate.”
The Court believes that narrowly drawn
contribution limits are not a direct infringement on political dialogue because
contributors can engage in political dialogue of their own, and they have other
73
ways to express support for a candidate.
69

This is because the Court applies strict scrutiny at the point at where a campaign
restriction imposes a substantial restraint on freedom of speech and freedom of
association. See infra note 77.
70
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. Although not specifically mentioned in the Constitution,
“freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The
Constitution protects freedom of association “where the association’s goal or purpose
is one that the first amendment independently protects such as political advocacy,
litigation to advance social goals, or religious worship.” Ann H. Jameson, Note,
Roberts v. United States Jaycees: Discriminatory Membership Policy of a National
Organization held not Protected by First Amendment Freedom of Association, 34
CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1065-66 (1985).
71

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. Limitations on independent expenditures directly infringe
upon political dialogue, while narrowly tailored contribution limits affect the contentneutral aspect of speech, and are therefore a marginal interference with associational
freedoms. Id. at 19-39.
72
Id. at 21. It is arguable, however, that for some contributors a higher contribution
level expresses more support than a lower contribution level. Id. The Court stated
that the contributor’s financial ability and past history of contributions are factors that
may assess the intensity of the support, but it did not integrate these factors in its
analysis of whether the Buckley limits were narrowly tailored. Id. at 21 n.22. The fact
that the Court recognized these factors underscores the importance of ensuring that
the restriction is narrowly drawn.
73
Id. at 28-29. “[C]ontribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any
material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and
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Contribution limits may also affect a candidate’s free speech rights.
Pooling contributions may be the only way for candidates lacking personal
74
wealth to engage in political dialogue. Narrowly drawn contribution limits do
not dramatically affect campaign funding because a candidate can raise funds
from a greater number of contributors, or encourage contributors to engage in
75
direct political expression. However, limits on campaign contributions directly
impair political dialogue if a candidate or political committee is unable to “amass
76
the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”
A contribution limit is unconstitutional at the point it directly interferes
with political speech or association. A contributor must be able to express
support for a candidate, and the candidate must be able to engage in political
advocacy. A narrowly drawn contribution limit does not regulate political
77
communication but only regulates the content-neutral speech
that lies
78
beyond the political communication.
However, because of the difficulty in
determining the precise level of regulation that may or may not affect political
79
80
speech, a heightened level of intermediate scrutiny is required.
campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press,
candidates, and political parties.” Id. at 29. This is because “persons [are] free to
engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering
their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in
supporting candidates and committees with financial resources.” Id. at 28. See also
supra note 30.
74
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
75
Id. at 22.
76
Id. at 21. Supporting its argument that the FECA limits did not directly affect
political dialogue, the Court notes that only 5.1% of the money raised for candidates in
the 1974 Congressional race was obtained in amounts that exceeded the Act’s $1,000
limitations. Id. at 21 n.23. In addition, “two major-party senatorial candidates . . .
operated large-scale campaigns on contributions raised under a voluntarily imposed
$100 contribution limitation.” Id. at 21 n.23.
77

A narrowly drawn contribution limit is content-neutral because it does not affect the
contributor’s expression of support for a candidate. Symbolic speech inherent in
campaign contributions is not proportional to the size of the contribution. Buckley,
424 U.S. at 19. Consequently, because different levels of contributions do not
necessarily involve different levels of speech, a narrowly drawn limitation only affects
the content-neutral aspect of the speech.
78
See supra note 73.
79
See supra note 72.
80
See Stone, supra note 68. There are at least seven standards of review for contentneutral speech that represent three distinct standards: deferential, intermediate, and
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2. Buckley’s Plain Language
Support for intermediate scrutiny is also found in the plain language of
Buckley. Under strict scrutiny, the Court demands “a compelling rather than
substantial interest and that the challenged restriction is ‘necessary’ to achieve
81
that interest.”
In discussing contribution limits, however, the Court
characterizes the governmental goal of limiting corruption or the appearance of
82
corruption as a “constitutionally sufficient justification” and a “weighty
83
84
interest,” but not a compelling interest.
The Court also deferred to
Congressional judgment that a contribution limit is the appropriate method to
85
combat corruption or the appearance of corruption and did not require proof
strict review. Id. at 50. In Buckley, the Court rejected the deferential standard which
treats contribution limits as conduct, not political speech. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16,
citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Contra, supra note 27.
81
Stone, supra note 68 at 53, citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm’r
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1983); Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign
Comm., (1982) 459 U.S. 87, 92; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 606-07 (1982); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39. (1963) Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), further illustrates why
expenditure limits are subject to strict scrutiny.
Buckley “stands for the proposition that speaker-based laws demand
strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government’s preference for the
substance of what the favored speakers have to say (or aversion to
what the disfavored speakers have to say). . . . Because the
expenditure limit in Buckley was designed to ensure that the political
speech of the wealthy not drown out the speech of others, we found
that it was concerned with the communicative impact of the regulated
speech. . . . Indeed, were the expenditure limitation unrelated to the
content of expression, there would have been no perceived need for
Congress to ‘equalize the relative ability’ of interested individuals to
influence elections.”
Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 658, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48 (emphasis
added) (internal citations omitted).
82
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
83
Id. at 29.
84
In contrast, the Court characterized preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption as a compelling interest in cases that challenged the constitutionality of
expenditure limits. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97 (stating that these interests are “the
only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified”); Colorado
Republican, 518 U.S. at 609 (stating that the Court has weighed First Amendment
interests against compelling governmental interests).
85
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28. The Court stated that “Congress was surely entitled to
conclude that . . . contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to
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86

that the limits were necessary to meet this goal. Consequently, the Court
applied a heightened level of intermediate scrutiny to the speech analysis as
87
pertaining to contribution limits.
88

Limitations affect the contributor’s freedom of association more so
89
than freedom of speech. Freedom of association plays a very important role
in political advocacy because pooling campaign contributions may be the only
90
way for contributors to deliver a political message.
However, contribution
91
limits merely restrict, not prohibit, this aspect of associational freedom.
As
with freedom of speech, contributors are left with a variety of ways to exercise

deal with the reality or appearance of corruption,” and that bribery and disclosure laws
are only partial solutions. Id. at 28.
86
For the requirements of strict scrutiny, see supra note 68.
87
Stone, supra note 68. Contribution “restrictions are constitutional if they serve
‘sufficiently strong, subordinating’ interests by means of ‘narrowly drawn regulations
designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First
Amendment freedoms’.” Id. at 49-50. (Internal citations omitted). In Turner
Broadcasting, the Court noted that under intermediate scrutiny, a court should
consider whether “‘constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means’ of achieving the
Government’s asserted interests” do not exist in order to prevent suppressing more
speech than necessary. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 668, quoting Sable
Communications of Cal.., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989).
88
See supra note 24.
89
“[T]he primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act’s contribution limitations
is their restriction of one aspect of the contributors’s freedom of political association.”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25 (emphasis added). The political expression inherent with
campaign contributions is valued by our society, and restricting that expression
impairs associational freedoms. Id. at 15. ‘“[E]ffective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association.’” Id., quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
90

If a message that depends on associational freedoms is suppressed, the only
message heard will be from the speaker with independent funds. See Citizens
Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 299. In Citizens Against Rent Control, a Berkeley,
California ordinance placed a limitation of $250 on contributions to committees formed
to support or oppose ballot measures, but it did not limit the amount of money an
individual could spend for the same activity. Id. at 292. The Court held that singling
out and restricting those who pool their money was a restraint of their associational
freedoms. Id. at 300.
91
Contribution limits affect only one narrow aspect of associational freedoms: the
ability of “like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common
political goals.” Buckley, 424 U.S at 22.
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92

their associational freedoms.
The Court held in Buckley that a restriction
becomes unconstitutional when it is no longer “closely drawn to avoid
93
unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.”
This is not strict
94
scrutiny.
3. The Eighth Circuit’s Analysis
The Eighth Circuit applies strict scrutiny to all campaign restrictions but
it does not address whether a contribution restriction directly infringes First
95
Amendment rights.
To circumvent this question, it mischaracterizes
Supreme Court analysis by stating that The Court expressed support for
96
intermediate scrutiny in dicta only. In reality, the Court repeatedly questions
whether a particular restriction directly limits the expression of political views,
and when it does the Court strikes down the restriction under a strict
97
analysis. The converse is true when the restriction does not directly infringe
92

See supra note 73.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
94
Arguably, this may be strict scrutiny for associational freedoms, but it requires the
same level of proof as intermediate scrutiny in the speech analysis. The Buckley
Court purported to apply strict scrutiny when it reviewed the Act’s disclosure
requirement and its affect on associational freedoms. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64-66. It
stated that “[t]he strict test established by NAACP v. Alabama is necessary because
compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First
Amendment rights.” Id. at 66. However, immediately following that statement, the
Court only required a “sufficiently important” governmental interest and a reasonable
conclusion by Congress that full disclosure will “prevent the corrupt use of money to
affect elections.” Id. at 66-67. If strict scrutiny was applied, the Government would be
required to show that the restriction was necessary to serve a compelling interest.
95
Ironically, the Eighth Circuit recognizes that there is a constitutional distinction
between restrictions on independent expenditures and contributions. Carver, 72 F.3d
at 637. However, it does not acknowledge the distinction between the levels of
scrutiny. Because the Supreme Court has not specifically held that intermediate
scrutiny applies to contribution limits, the Eighth Circuit applies strict scrutiny to
contribution limitations. Id. at 637-38.
93

96

Carver, 72 F.3d at 637, citing FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 259-60 (1986); California Medical Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 196 (Marshall, J., plurality);
Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 301 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
97
California Medical Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 194-95 (stating that the contribution limits in
Buckley “did not directly infringe on the ability of contributors to express their own
political views”); Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 614-16 (1996) (stating that a
fundamental constitutional difference exists between independent expenditures and
contributions, and that contribution limitations only impose a marginal restriction on
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speech. For example, in California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, the appellants,
California Medical Association (CMA), argued that the Federal Election
99
Campaign Act’s $5000 multicandidate political committee contribution limit
was the same as an unconstitutional expenditure limitation because it restricted
100
their ability to engage in political speech through PAC expenditures.
The
Court rejected this proposition, stating that
the ‘speech by proxy’ that CMA seeks to achieve through its
contributions . . . is not the sort of political advocacy that this
Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment
protection . . . . Our decision in Buckley precludes any
argument to the contrary. . . . [T]he First Amendment rights of
a contributor are not infringed by limitations on the amount he
101
may contribute to a campaign organization . . . .
B. Deference to a Governmental Determination of Corruption or the
Appearance of Corruption
The Supreme Court has consistently relied on the prevention of
speech), citing NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497. In Bellotti, the Court struck down a state
statute that forbid certain independent expenditures by business corporations aimed at
influencing ballot initiatives. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767-68. “Especially where, as here,
a prohibition is directed at speech itself, and the speech is intimately related to the
process of governing, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest
which is compelling . . . .” Id. at 786 (internal citations omitted).
98
453 U.S. 182 (1981).
99
The FECA provides in pertinent part that “‘no person shall make contributions . . . to
any other political committee in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed
$5,000.’” Id. at 185 n.2, quoting 2 USC § 441a(a)(1)(C). “A ‘multicandidate political
committee’ is defined as a ‘political committee which has been registered under
section 433 of this title for a period of not less that 6 months, which has received
contributions from more than 50 persons, and . . . has made contributions to 5 or more
candidates for Federal Office.’” Id. at 185 n.1, quoting 2 USC § 441a (a)(4).
100
Id. at 195. CMA filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality
of the contribution limitation in response to a Federal Election Commission
enforcement action. Id. at 186. The FEC believed that CMA contributed more than
$5,000 to a political committee that it formed, the California Medical Political Action
Committee (CALPAC). Id.
101

Id. at 196-97 In Buckley, the Court found that independent expenditures are entitled
to full First Amendment protection because restrictions “impose direct and substantial
restraints on the quantity of political speech.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39. “[T]he
governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is
inadequate to justify [the Act’s] ceiling on independent expenditures.” Id. at 45.
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corruption or the appearance of corruption to determine if the government has
sufficiently justified a limit on political contributions or independent
102
expenditures.
In FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee
103
(NCPAC),
Chief Justice Rehnquist defined corruption as “a subversion of
the political process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their
obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions
of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid
104
pro quo: dollars for political favors.”
In NCPAC, the Court legitimized the
governmental interest of preventing both actual quid pro quo corruption, but
also the prospect of elected officials being influenced by financial gain or
105
infusions of money.
Even though states consistently rely on corruption or the appearance
106
of corruption to argue the constitutionality of a particular reform measure,
inconsistencies arise when courts analyze whether the State has proven that it
102

NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97; Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 296-97;
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-89.
103
470 U.S. 480 (1985).
104
Id. at 497. This is a broader concern than given in Buckley, where the Court was
concerned only with “the extent that large contributions are given to secure political
quid pro quo . . . .” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
105
Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST .
COMMENTARY 127 (1997). Arguably, the Court expanded the concept of corruption
again in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). Austin
upheld restrictions on campaign expenditures by a corporation in order to protect
election campaigns from the distorting effects of wealth. Neuborne, supra note 30, at
808. Protecting the election campaign is a broader purpose than focusing on the
improper influences large contributions may have on an elected official. See id.
106
Commentators and courts hold tight to the notion that preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption is the only legitimate governmental interest to justify
restrictions on campaign contributions. See, e.g., supra note 4. However, in NCPAC,
the Court held that these are the “only legitimate and compelling governmental
interests thus far identified . . . .” NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97 (emphasis added). In
Buckley, the Court did not invalidate the interest of equalizing “the relative ability of all
citizens to affect the outcome of elections” as it pertains to contribution limits.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. It merely avoided the issue by holding that the corruption
rationale was a sufficient justification to impose contribution limits. Id.
When discussing independent expenditure limits, however, the Court stated
that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment.” Id. at 48-49. This distinction is explained by the fact that independent
expenditure limits are a direct restraint on political expression and contribution limits
are not. See supra note 81.
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has been harmed by large contributors. Some courts, including the Eighth
107
Circuit, require the State to provide objective proof of harm.
Other courts
108
defer to the government’s determination that the harm exists.
107

In the Eighth Circuit, if the state claims that limitations are necessary to remedy
perceived corruption, it must prove that the perception is reasonable and derived from
the magnitude of the contributions. See Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 519 (syllabus). In
Russell, the court held that if the state claims a limit is necessary to prevent actual
corruption, it must provide demonstrable evidence that a state representative’s position
on a bill changed due to an intervening contribution, or evidence of voting in a relevant
fashion in response to a contribution. Russell, 146 F.3d at 569-70. The court stated
that concealing the source of a contribution is also reasonable proof of corruption. Id.
at 570. See also National Black Police Ass’n, 924 F.Supp at 281-81.
The Eighth Circuit’s analysis is similar to the district court’s in Democratic
Party of the United States v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, where
it rejected evidence of the appearance of corruption. Democratic Party of the United
States v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC I), 578 F. Supp.
797, 824-830 (E.D. Pa. 1983) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480
(1985). In NCPAC I, the district court held that “evidence of high-level appointments in
the Reagan administration of persons connected with the PACs, [] newspaper articles
and polls purportedly showing a public perception of corruption . . . [and] [a] tendency
to demonstrate distrust of PACs” was not sufficient evidence of corruption or the
appearance of corruption. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 499. “[A]n exchange of political favors
for uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing more.”
Id. at 498. Although NCPAC I rejected proof that is similar to the proof accepted in
Shrink I, an important distinction between the cases is the manner in which the
restrictions infringe First Amendment rights. NCPAC imposed limitations on a
presidential candidate’s independent expenditures when accepting public financing for
their general election campaign. Id. at 482, citing 26 USC § 9012(f). However, these
limitations result in a direct infringement on speech and the Court employed strict
scrutiny. Id. at 496-97. In contrast, Shrink III addresses contribution limits, in which
narrowly drawn limits demand intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny. See supra
note 87.
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit, the Middle District of Florida held in Florida
Right to Life that although the evidence did not specifically involve large contributions
in exchange for political favors, evidence pointing to a willingness to exchange favors
for money is a legitimate basis of concern over large contributions. Florida Right to
Life, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16694, at *21 n.12. Some courts do not engage in the
analysis at all. See Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d 637 (1997).
108
Some courts first analyze whether a particular contribution limitation is different in
kind from Buckley limitations. See, e.g., Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 648.
The Sixth Circuit makes an absolute comparison but does not explain why a $1,000
per election year limit in 1997 is not different in kind from Buckley’s $1,000 per
election limit in 1976. Id. See also Florida Right to Life, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16694, at *25 (making an absolute dollar comparison with Buckley).
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If the government relies solely on preventing corruption to justify
contribution limitations it should provide objective proof of corruption. Even
under an intermediate level of scrutiny, “[w]hen the Government defends a
regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated
harms, it must do more than simply ‘posit the existence of the disease sought to
109
be cured.’”
Speculation about harm is not a sufficient justification to
110
restrain First Amendment rights.
If government claims that large campaign
contributions result in corruption, the government should provide proof of
corruption. Deference to a legislative finding of corruption is unnecessary
111
112
because quid pro quo corruption
is essentially bribery,
and this can be
proven in a court of law. A more difficult problem involves what proof will satisfy
113
a showing of the appearance
of corruption as the result of a large
contribution.
109

Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 664, quoting Quincy Cable TV Inc. v. FCC, 768
F.2d 1434, 1455 (CADC 1985). See also Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 618;
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475; Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 522 n.3.
110
Even “a ‘reasonable’ burden on expression requires a justification far stronger than
mere speculation about serious harms.” NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475, quoting Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (“Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women
. . . . To justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear
that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.”). In discussing contribution
limits, the Buckley Court noted that there were “deeply disturbing examples” of
corruption in the 1972 election, proving that the governmental justification of preventing
corruption was not based on mere speculation of corruption. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
111
Quid pro quo corruption occurs when elected officials are “influenced to act contrary
to their obligations of office.” NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497.
112
Bribery is defined as “the giving, offering, or taking of bribes.” W EBSTER’S NEW
W ORLD DICTIONARY 66 (2d college ed. 1974). Bribes are “anything given or promised
to induce a person to do something against his wishes.” Id. It is reasonable to
assume that elected officials wish to meet their obligations of office, but there are
many interpretations of what is an obligation of office.
Professor Strauss argues that bribery of elected officials is not the most
important concern with campaign contributions because elected officials do not enrich
themselves by the receipt of contributions. David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and
Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM . L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1994). The candidate
uses contributions to obtain votes through a campaign, but this is no different than the
ordinary practice of taking a position on an issue to obtain votes. Id. at 1373. One
could argue, however, that personal enrichment is not narrowly limited to immediate
monetary gain. Undoubtedly, elected officials are enriched by notoriety, power and
career opportunities as a direct result of winning a campaign and serving in office.
113
Appearance is defined as “the look or outward aspect of a person or thing . . . , the
way things seem to be.” W EBSTER’S NEW W ORLD DICTIONARY 66 (2d college ed. 1974).
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Perceived corruption could require actual corruption, arguing that
114
without actual corruption, the appearance of corruption is unreasonable.
This argument fails because the Buckley Court addressed the appearance of
corruption as a separate matter and only required “public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial
115
contributions.”
Therefore, the Government should prove that the public is
aware of the opportunity for abuse by elected officials and that the abuse
comes from large contributions. Unfortunately, this is not as simple as charging
an elected official with accepting bribes and relying on a jury to render a
116
verdict.
The focus is on the broader belief of the electorate, not on the
conduct of one or several elected officials. As a result, courts should give
deference to a reasonable legislative determination regarding the appearance
117
of corruption as perceived by the electorate.
In Shrink I, the district court found that the electorate perceived
118
corruption of elected officials as the result of large contributions.
In Shrink
114

The Eighth Circuit would probably reject empirical evidence of perceived corruption
by the electorate if not accompanied by proof of actual corruption. See supra note 61.
115
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added). Concern about the public’s awareness
of “improper influence ‘is [] critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’” Id., quoting United States
Civil Service Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973).
116
Which would be the case for quid pro quo corruption. See supra notes 111-12.
117
This position is supported by the Court in Turner Broadcasting, where it noted that
“[s]ound policymaking often requires legislators to forecast future events and to
anticipate the likely impact of these events based on deductions and inferences for
which complete empirical support may be unavailable.” Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S.
at 665. For intermediate scrutiny, the government only has to show “reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence.” Id. at 666.
118
First, the district court cited an affidavit by Senator Wayne Goode who co-chaired
the Interim Joint Committee on Campaign Finance Reform.
In that affidavit, the Senator stated that the Committee ‘heard
testimony on and discussed the significant issue of balancing the
need for campaign contributions versus the potential for buying
influence.’ He further testified to his belief that contributions in
excess of the limits set by Missouri [in Senate Bill 650] ‘have the
appearance of buying votes as well as the real potential to buy
votes.’
Shrink I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 738. The district court cited numerous newspaper stories
and editorials leading up to the adoption of Senate Bill 650 and Proposition A,
concluding that the public’s perception of corruption comported with the Senator’s
affidavit. Id. at 738-39 nn.6-7. The court also noted that seventy-four percent of voters
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II, the Eighth Circuit focused on proof of actual corruption and granted no
119
deference to the legislature’s determination of perceived corruption.
However, intermediate scrutiny requires that “courts must accord substantial
120
deference to the predictive judgments” of the government.
This includes a
reasonable legislative determination that there is an appearance of corruption
as the result of large contributions. Once the government reasonably
ascertains that it is necessary to remedy the appearance of corruption, the
121
court should question whether the limits are narrowly drawn.
C. Narrowly Drawn Contribution Limits
When a court finds that the government has stated a legitimate interest
or put forth sufficient proof of harm, it employs one of several tests to
determine if a contribution limit is unconstitutionally low. Some courts make
absolute dollar comparisons with Buckley, claiming that a $1,000 contribution
122
limit is not “different in kind” from Buckley’s $1,000 limit.
Other courts make
inflationary adjustments to the challenged limits and then compare them with
123
Buckley.
Courts may also evaluate the percentage of contributors affected

supported Proposition A, further proof that the public shared the Senator’s views. Id. at
739 n7.
119
The Eighth Circuit simply focused on Senator Goode’s affidavit and dismissed the
evidence of perceived corruption. Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 522. The “senator pointed to
no evidence that ‘large’ campaign contributions were being made in the days before
limits were in place, much less that they resulted in real corruption or the perception
thereof.” Id., citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. “The senator did not state that corruption
then existed in the system, only that he and his colleagues believed there was the
‘real potential to buy votes’ if the limits were not enacted, and that contributions
greater than the limits ‘have the appearance of buying votes.’” Id.
In contrast, the district court noted that “members of the legislature are
uniquely qualified to gauge whether allowing those contributions to go unchecked
endangers our democratic system of government, and, if so, to prescribe an
appropriate remedy therefor.” Shrink I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
120
Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 665.
121
Buckley “stressed that the judiciary should not take out a scalpel to probe dollar
limitations because ‘distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be
said to amount to differences in kind.’” Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 64 quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (upholding $1,000 contribution limit because it was not
different in kind from Buckley).
122
See Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 648; Florida Right to Life, 1998 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 16694, at *25.
123

The Eighth Circuit employs this standard. See text accompanying supra notes 4653. In dissent, Judge Gibson strongly disagrees with this analysis. Shrink II, 161
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124

by the limits,
and whether the contribution limits prevent a candidate from
125
mounting an effective campaign.
When determining if a contribution limit unconstitutionally infringes a
126
contributor or candidate’s First Amendment rights
the Court considers
whether the restriction directly impairs an essential function of the First
Amendment, which is to enable all members of society to participate in
127
democratic decision-making.
The point at which a contribution limit directly
F.3d at 525 (Gibson, J., dissent).
[E]ven if it were proper to adjust Buckley for inflation, [this analysis]
lacks a principled yardstick to assess the constitutionality of any
contribution limit. Its measure of what ‘differs in kind’ and what
‘differs in degree’ from the Buckley limits is standardless and lacks
any explanation to support its bald conclusion that the limits at issue
are ‘overtly restrictive as a matter of law.’
Id.
124
In National Black Police Ass’n, the court held that the contribution limits were
unconstitutional because 17% to 84% of individual contributions were higher than the
imposed limits, and as a result, candidates had to resort to less effective methods of
disseminating their message. National Black Police Ass’n., 924 F. Supp. at 275-81.
125
“[C]ontribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the
limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the
resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. See also
California Prolife, 989 F.Supp. at 1297 (holding that $500 per election makes it
impossible for an ordinary candidate to mount an effective campaign); Fireman v.
United States, 20 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D. Mass. 1998). Citing Buckley, the Fireman
court stated that it must consider how the contribution limitation affects the financing
of political campaigns, and “such assessment should occur in a evidentiary context of
actual figures on costs, contributions, and expenditures in order fully to assess the
impact” of the contribution limit. Fireman, 20 F.Supp. 2d at 236, citing Buckley, 424
U.S. at 21-22.
126
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
127
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 882-84 (1963). Professor Emerson identifies reasons why the First Amendment
freedoms of speech and association serve political decision-making. Id. First,
“[f]reedom of expression in the political realm is usually a necessary condition for
securing freedom elsewhere.” Id. at 883. Next, speech enables the government to
ascertain “the needs and wishes of its citizens” and to be responsive to its people. Id.
Finally, the Declaration of Independence states that the government derives its power
from the consent of its citizens, and “the governed must, in order to exercise their right
of consent, have full freedom of expression both in forming individual judgments and in
forming the common judgment.” Id. See also Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech
Justifications, 89 COLUM L. REV. 119 (1989).
This function of the First Amendment raises additional questions regarding the
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infringes upon the First Amendment rights of candidates and contributors is the
128
point at which a court should reject the limit as unconstitutional.
The court
should evaluate if the candidate can engage in effective political advocacy in
129
the candidate’s district despite the contribution limits.
This measure will also
help determine if the contributors’ right to associate with a candidate is
infringed. If candidates cannot deliver political speech a supporting contributor
130
may be inable to associate with their candidate of choice.
A court should
also examine the percentage of contributors affected by the limitation to
determine if the government favors individual speech over speech that relies
131
on the pooling of money.
Because different voting districts demand different
levels of funds to engage in effective political advocacy, a limitation can be
tailored to the type or character of the campaign without preventing the
132
133
purpose of association or speech.
The Eighth Circuit’s inflation analysis
is not a meaningful measure. Buckley did not establish $1,000 as a
constitutional floor for a contribution limit. The Court merely held that the
134
limitation would not affect First Amendment rights to any significant degree.
An inflationary analysis makes no distinction between the cost of a Federal
campaign with that of a campaign for city council in a municipality of less than
100,000 people. This analysis is an easy way for a court to strike down a
campaign limitation without placing it in context for the community the limitation
role of the government to meet these goals. Some commentators argue that the First
Amendment is a grant of governmental power to ensure that the voices of the
electorate are equalized and not drowned out by the voices of the wealthy. See, e.g.,
Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV . L. REV. 781 (Feb. 1987); Others view the
First Amendment as a restraint on governmental power for the purpose of allowing
unfettered speech. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 6.
128
See supra note 125. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the restriction not
unnecessarily infringe First Amendment rights while strict scrutiny requires that the
restriction is necessary. See supra notes 60, 75. However, commentators argue that
almost all forms of campaign finance reform are ineffective. See supra note 4.
Therefore, like strict scrutiny, if the contribution limit is a direct infringement but there
is no impact on the appearance of corruption, it unnecessarily infringes on the
contributor or candidates’s rights.
129
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text
130
Affiliating with a candidate is one aspect of freedom of association. Buckley, 424
U.S. at 22. See also infra note 70.
131
This analysis is similar to that employed in Citizens Against Rent Control. See
supra note 90.
132
This was reflected in the contribution scheme set forth by Missouri that the Eighth
Circuit invalidated in Carver and Shrink II. See supra note 40-41.
133
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
134
Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 525 (Gibson, J., dissenting). See also supra note 123.
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purports to serve.
V. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit’s analysis is faulty in several respects. First, the
Buckley Court did not employ strict scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality of
restrictions on campaign contributions. It employed the lesser standard of
135
heightened intermediate scrutiny.
Second, the Eighth Circuit requires
objective proof of harm while ignoring the circumstances under which
136
contribution limits were effectuated in Missouri.
Senate Bill 650 and
Proposition A were enacted in consideration of the influence of large
137
contributions on the democratic process.
The facts established in the
138
district court
are sufficient proof of the appearance of corruption under
139
intermediate scrutiny.
Finally, merely adjusting for inflation is not the proper
test to determine if a contribution limit is narrowly tailored to serve both speech
140
and associational rights.
The proper test determines the effect of the limits
on both the percentage of total contributions received, and the number of
141
contributors affected.
Under this analysis, the Supreme Court should
overturn the Eighth Circuit in Shrink III and reinstate Senate Bill 650’s
142
contribution limits.
Jane Conrad

135

See supra notes 65-101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
137
Id.
138
See supra note 118.
139
See supra notes 87. Curiously, although the Eighth Circuit demanded objective
proof of harm regarding the appearance of corruption, the court relied on pure
speculation when stating, in dicta, that the contribution limits were not narrowly
tailored. Shrink II, 161 F.3d at 523. “In today’s dollars, the SB650 limits appear likely
to ‘have a severe impact on political dialogue’ by preventing many candidates for public
office ‘from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy,” Id., quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).
140
See supra note 123.
141
See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
142
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
136
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